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Forging New Partnerships: Teacher Unions and 
Educational Reform in the 90s 
David S. Doty • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The status of America's schools is an issue of major 
concern across the United States. 1 Spurred by A Nation at 
Risk, 2 citizens and educators joined forces a decade ago to 
attempt unprecedented, far-reaching changes in public 
education. Unfortunately, actual improvement has been 
minimal. Although student performance standards have risen 
and financial support for education has increased, much of 
what happens in American classrooms remains unchanged.3 In 
order to effect meaningful change in public education, a new 
direction must be taken, one which focuses not on top-down 
mandates but on the expertise and experience of teachers. 
This paper focuses specifically on site-based management 
initiatives and the role local teacher associations should take in 
* Associate at Hanson, Epperson & Smith, Salt Lake City, Utah. B.A., 
Brigham Young University, 1989; M.A. Stanford University, 1990; J.D. Brigham 
Young University, 1993; Ph.D. Candidate, Brigham Young University. 
1. Charting a Course for Reform, in FROM RISK TO RENEWAL (EDUC. WEEK 
Special Report), EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 10, 1993, at 4. ("Never before has the nation 
carried on such a sustained and serious dialogue about educational renewal."). 
2. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983). 
3. Since the National Commission on Excellence in Education issued its 
report in 1983, spending for K-12 education has gone up 40 percent 
in inflation-adjusted dollars. . . . 
By the end of the 1980's, virtually every state had acted to 
impose the higher standards called for by the commission. Forty-two 
states had raised high school graduation requirements. Nearly every 
state had instituted a student-testing program. Three-fourths of high 
schools reported stricter attendance standards. And 70 percent set 
academic standards for athletics and extracurricular activities. 
ld. at 3. 
But all of these efforts, however well intentioned, have scarcely 
touched the classroom. As a new century nears, our schools seem 
firmly anchored in the old. 
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developing the policies surrounding these initiatives. If 
substantive reform is ever to take place at the classroom level, 
teachers must play a key role, one that allows them to have 
full participation in the workplace, not simply token decision-
making power that only serves bureaucratic convenience. Yet 
while teacher unions should actively promote increased teacher 
participation, they should not let popular reform projects 
undermine teacher protections embodied in collective 
bargaining agreements. Reform initiatives, many of which give 
increased responsibility and incentives to individual teachers, 
must not compromise the unions' mission of protecting the 
terms and conditions of employment for the entire community 
of teachers. 
Part II of this paper discusses the current trend toward 
site-based management and the problems this trend poses for 
teachers. Part III examines changing approaches to collective 
bargaining. Although not a substitute for formal collective 
bargaining, "collaborative bargaining'' outside the sphere of 
formal negotiations may be a first step toward reaching binding 
agreement on participatory management issues. Part IV 
considers how conflicting values of individual participation and 
protection of community interests affect teacher hiring and 
transfer policies. Part V concludes that by properly advocating 
educational reform, in a manner that both promotes 
meaningful change and recognizes the community interests of 
teachers, teacher unions can be true agents for change in the 
fight for better public schools. 
II. BARRIERS TO SITE-BASED MANAGEMENT 
Over the past forty years, there has been a dramatic 
increase in both state and national control of public schools, 
with a corresponding decrease in local control.4 The surge in 
state control has been especially strong due to public pressure 
for reform and the "new federalism" policies of the Reagan and 
Bush administrations.5 However, in an attempt to make 
schools more responsive to communities6 and improve the 
4. Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control of the Schools Still a Viable Option?, 
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'¥ 447, 456 (1991). 
5. See ld. "New federalism" refers to the efforts of Presidents Reagan and 
Bush to reduce federal involvement and control over matters traditionally within 
the realm of state governments. 
6. ld. at 469. 
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educational process, 7 many school districts are beginning to 
transfer authority to local schools under a system called site-
based or school-based management. 
The reasoning behind this trend is that the complex 
problems facing schools are "best handled where and when 
instruction occurs."8 In addition, proponents of site-based 
management view it as a concrete way to improve the terms 
and conditions of teachers' employment. The idea is that as 
teachers come to be treated as "professional partners" instead 
of hired servants, they will be more satisfied with their jobs 
and be more productive.9 Teacher unions, however, have been 
reluctant to endorse employee involvement initiatives for the 
following reasons. 
A. Participatory Management as a Token Gesture 
While active employee participation can result in a variety 
of positive outcomes, 10 the inclusion of employees in decision 
making does not automatically improve the success of an enter-
prise. 11 Participatory schemes often fail when employees are 
given the trappings of authority but not the power to set their 
own agenda and act conclusively thereon. 12 
Failed participatory schemes have been common in public 
education. Several studies have concluded that teachers often 
feel that participation is nothing more than a "manipulative 
tool" devoid of any real meaning. 13 According to one national 
survey, teachers felt that "previous participation afforded them 
little real influence and hence increased their skepticism. 
Nonetheless, they thought they should be more involved in 
school and district decision making, especially with respect to 
7. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS: 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SCHOOL SITE 22·23 (1988) (noting that site-based 
decision-making programs foster collegiality, and the resulting reduction of teacher 
isolation increases educational effectiveness). 
8. JEROME M. ROSOW & ROBERT ZAGER, ALLIES IN EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
147 (1989). 
9. Elizabeth Steinberger, Teachers Unions Handling Tricky Turns On the 
Road to Reform, THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR, Sept. 1990, at 26-27. 
10. Sharon C. Conley et al., Teacher Participation in the Management of 
School Systems, 90 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, 259, 260 (1988). 
11. !d. 
12. !d. 
13. !d. at 261. 
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issues directly affecting their immediate teaching responsibil-
ities."14 
A good example of this dilemma is the use of quality circles 
in public schools. 15 Designed to give teachers the opportunity 
to have meaningful input into the decisions affecting their 
workplace, quality circles have not met with overwhelming 
approval. First, teachers have protested that circle proposals 
are not taken seriously and administrators often delay imple-
mentation of the proposals.16 Second, teachers complain that 
quality circles "lack an explicit and ongoing purpose,"17 and 
that the circles do not represent a legitimate long-term solution 
to the lack of teacher decision making. Finally, because they 
are usually imposed by management, quality circles are often 
perceived by teachers as only one more token gesture by man-
agement meant to appease, not actively involve, them. 18 
B. The Down Side of Administration 
A second reason that site-based management programs 
have met with resistance from unions is that while it is plausi-
ble to view teachers as managers, 19 the reality is that many 
teachers do not want to be managers, at least as managers are 
traditionally defined. 20 Even the most reform-minded teachers 
have expressed doubt with respect to the benefits of becoming 
14. ld. 
15. Quality circles have been defined as: 
A small group of between three and twelve people who do the same or 
similar work, voluntarily meeting together regularly for about an hour per 
week in paid time, usually under the leadership of their own supervisor, 
and trained to identify, analyze, and solve some of the problems in their 
work, presenting solutions to management, and where possible, imple-
menting the solutions themselves. 
ld. at 269. 
16. ld. at 270. 
17. ld. 
18. ld. 
19. Samuel B. Bacharach et al., School Management and Teacher Unions: The 
Capacity for Cooperation in an Age of Reform, 91 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 97, 
102 (1989). 
20. For example, "[a ]I though 97 percent of classroom teachers believe that 
teachers should be involved in the selection of texts, less than half believe that 
teachers should be involved in peer review (31 percent), the selection of new princi-
pals (42 percent), or decisions about school-level budget allocations (39 percent)." 
LORRAINE M. MCDONNELL & ANTHONY PASCAL, TEACHER UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM 55-56 (1988) (citing METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE METRO-
POLITAN SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN TEACHER 1986 (1987)). 
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quasi-administrators. Teachers do not want to waste time per-
forming administrative tasks, particularly when such tasks are 
viewed as unproductive. 21 For example, consider the following 
description of teachers at Central Park East Secondary School 
in New York City, the site of a groundbreaking reform effort: 
[T]hey did not want the same kind of information and control 
over budget and resources that [the principals] had, because 
they did not want to take the time to deal with the complexi-
ties, the politics, and the work. They clearly did want to con-
tinue their role in policy making, but not with the same de-
tailed responsibility for implementation that the principal 
had. 22 
C. Egalitarian Norms of Teachers 
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Finally, unions have opposed giving teachers more admin-
istrative responsibilities because of the threat such a shift 
poses to egalitarian values held by teachers as a group and to 
the protections embodied in collective bargaining agreements. 
On one hand, unions recognize that without proper incentives, 
site based management initiatives will flounder because teach-
ers will not assume more work for the same pay.23 On the oth-
er hand, unions have largely rejected attempts to pay individu-
al teachers more for assuming managerial responsibilities on 
grounds that providing "managerial teachers" higher salaries 
violates egalitarian norms held by teachers as a community.24 
From the unions' perspective, even partial movement out of the 
classroom to take on administrative duties as a reward for good 
teaching is intolerable. Therefore, unions argue that all teach-
ers should be given the opportunity to share in school gover-
nance, not just a select group of quasi-administrators.25 
One way that unions assert the participation rights of all 
teachers is through collective bargaining. While critics argue 
that teacher unions are interested only in prescribing narrow 
21. See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 9, at 27 (noting that in Chicago, some 
teachers are complaining about the number, length, content, and quality of local 
school council meetings). 
22. Rosow & ZAGER, supra note 8, at 239. 
23. See Ann Bradley, Sclwol Reforms Bump Up Against Unions' Most Cher-
ished Protections, EDUC. WEEK, Dec. 9, 1992, at 1. 
24. Conley, supra note 10, at 274-75. 
25. !d. at 275. 
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rules governing the workplace,26 in truth, the underlying pur-
pose of collective bargaining is to secure fair treatment for all 
teachers.27 Therefore, unions are wary of site-based manage-
ment programs because of the possibility that these programs 
will undermine collective bargaining processes.28 Unions are 
worried that school-based management programs will fracture 
the bargaining unit and replace collective bargaining with a 
new form of labor-management relations unable to adequately 
protect teachers. 29 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND "COLLABORATIVE" ALTERNATIVES 
The role of collective bargaining in education has been 
sharply criticized in recent years as being antagonistic to con-
structive school reform. 30 This criticism has focused on two 
elements. First, the charge is made that collective bargaining 
creates an adversarial relationship between school boards, 
administrators, and teachers that discourages the cooperation 
26. Typical of this attitude are the remarks of Steven F. Wilson, co-director of 
the Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research in Boston, who writes: "The 
teachers' union demeans its own membership by insisting that everything about 
the workplace be prescribed, from the length of lunch breaks, to the length and 
schedule of the workday, to the maximum number of minutes per week that 
teachers are permitted to meet with one another." Bradley, supra note 23, at 16. 
27. One author, after reviewing the collective bargaining agreements of sev-
eral school districts, concluded: "Teachers wanted contracts that were protective but 
not prescriptive. As a group, they reported seeking negotiated agreements that 
ensured sufficient autonomy in their work, reasonable demands on their time, equi-
table treatment, and protection against abuse. They explicitly did not expect to run 
their schools." SUSAN MOORE JOHNSON, TEACHER UNIONS IN SCHOOLS 175 (1984). 
28. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 24. 
29. !d. 
30. See, e.g., The Struggle to Reform and Why It's Failing, THE SCHOOL AD-
MINISTRATOR, Feb. 1991, at 16, 17 (reviewing THOMAS TaCH, IN THE NAME OF 
EXCELLENCE (1991)) (noting that despite the wave of new initiatives in teaching, 
"union-backed impediments to teaching reform-seniority, the single salary sched-
ule, traditional state licensing laws, rigid distinctions between 'labor' and 
'management' in schools-remain in place in the vast majority of the nation's 
school systems"); James H. VanSciver, Teacher Dismissals, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 
1990, at 318-19 (arguing that teacher dismissals are essential to meaningful school 
reform but that termination processes are nearly guaranteed failure due to "pres-
sure from teacher unions and restrictive negotiated agreements"); Myron 
Lieberman, Educational Reform and Teacher Bargaining, GoV'T UNION REV., Winter 
1984, at 54 ("public sector bargaining poses insuperable obstacles to the educational 
reform movement"); Myron Lieberman, Here's Why the Key Recommendations of the 
Excellence Commission Never Will Become Reality in Most Local School Systems, 
THE AM. SCH. BOARD J., Feb. 1984, at 32 ("teacher bargaining as we know it will 
thwart most attempts at reform"). 
( 
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necessary to improve schools' performance.31 Second, it is 
claimed that teacher unions use collective bargaining for nar-
row and self-serving interests which impede the development of 
innovative educational policies.32 Although collective bargain-
ing still retains a critical role in the educational setting, 33 
teacher unions should explore alternative methods of bargain-
ing. Union willingness to depart, at least initially, from formal 
negotiations may increase the success of traditional bargaining 
and secure more direct participation by teachers in the decision 
making process. 
A. Two Potential Alternatives to Positional Bargaining 
While several avenues exist whereby unions might deal 
with management in a less formal and less confrontational 
manner than traditional collective bargaining,34 two of the 
most promising for teachers will be examined in the following 
discussion. 
1. Binding arbitration. 
Teacher unions have been largely unsuccessful in their 
efforts to improve the workplace for teachers through conven-
tional collective bargaining. Consequently, they have vigorously 
petitioned state legislatures to recognize the right to strike or 
to codify the right to binding arbitration.35 Unfortunately, as 
with the right to strike, binding arbitration has met with sub-
stantial political opposition.36 Most of the resistance to arbi-
31. See Bacharach, supra note 19, at 98; Kendrick Scott, The Case Against 
Collective Bargaining in Education, Gov'T UNION REV., Spring 1982, at 16. 
32. Susan Moore Johnson, Can Schools Be Reformed at the Bargaining Table?, 
89 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 269, 271 (1987); ROSOW & ZAGER, supra note 8, at 
20 (noting that public opinion has viewed teacher unions' obsession with the "bread 
and butter" issues of higher wages and better benefits as a major obstacle to ur-
ban educational reform). 
33. See infra notes 64-100 and accompanying text. 
34. See generally, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLECTNE BARGAINING: 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1991). 
35. Michael Finch & Trevor W. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public 
Schools: Reassessing Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1573, 
1626 (1984). 
36. !d. at 1627. Consider also the situation in Utah schools. The collective 
bargaining agreement governing Davis County, Utah, teachers contains a clause 
providing for mandatory binding arbitration upon impasse. However, a bill proposed 
in the 1993 Utah State Legislature to make such a provision state law was defeat-
ed by a vocal group of rural superintendents who were worried about "losing con-
trol." Interview with Mr. Vik Arnold, President, Davis Education Association, Janu-
1 
1 
,1 
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tration is centered on the perception that arbitrators will has-
ten the loss of local control that is alleged to already have oc-
curred under collective bargaining. 37 Yet the reality is that 
binding arbitration could have exactly the opposite effect. 
First, arbitration can resolve conflict in a much less hostile 
and disruptive manner than a strike. By channelling labor 
disagreements into a process designed to encourage "best of-
fers" and settlement, binding arbitration forces both teachers 
and management to be realistic in their demands. It also pro-
vides incentives for collaboration; both sides must compromise 
or risk having a decision imposed on them by an "outsider."38 
Ideally, an arbitrator is rarely employed;39 binding arbitration 
actually encourages voluntary settlement of localized disputes 
by creating the threat of outside intervention.40 
Second, there is evidence that arbitration can have an 
inflationary impact on teacher salary levels.41 If teacher sala-
ries were to increase through arbitration at least to the point 
where they were comparable to other salaries in the labor mar-
ket,42 teachers would perhaps be more willing to assume addi-
tional responsibilities in local site-based management initia-
tives. By raising teachers' pay, binding arbitration could facili-
tate teachers' active endorsement of the reforms many argue 
are necessary to increase teacher professionalism. 43 
Finally, binding arbitration has the potential to increase 
the success of the most local of procedures, i.e., collective bar-
gaining itself. The procedure of submitting disputes to a neu-
tral third party for his or her independent judgment on the 
ary, 1993. 
37. !d. 
38. !d. at 1628-29. 
39. !d. at 1629. 
40. !d. at 1630. 
41. !d. at 1631-47. 
42. !d. at 1632 (noting that because statutory criteria usually direct arbitra-
tors to examine "comparable" salaries in the labor market, "one would expect that 
the lowest paid employees could invoke or threaten to invoke arbitration to achieve 
some equalization of salaries with better-paid employees"). 
43. McDONNELL & PASCAL, supra note 20, at 55. According to McDonnell & 
Pascal, 
[n]ot only are provisions such as those regulating class size regarded by 
teacher unions as basic bread-and-butter items that need to be attained 
before the unions seek provisions establishing more professional teaching 
conditions, some of these bread-and-butter items also constitute the en-
abling conditions that support a more professional teaching environment. 
ld. n.l. 
( 
1 
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merits not only promotes peaceful settlement but also estab-
lishes precedent.44 Knowing that this precedent will weigh 
heavily in the outcome of future disputes, a party can exert 
significant bargaining leverage by threatening to invoke arbi-
tration when a conflict arises.45 Consequently, "the outcomes 
of arbitration proceedings can have dramatic effect on non-arbi-
trated outcomes."46 The specter of arbitration could play a 
large role in reducing the intransigent positions and deadlocks 
that often arise in public school collective bargaining. 
2. Educational Policy Trust Agreements 
A second alternative to conventional bargaining that has 
the potential both to enhance collective bargaining and to in-
crease the direct participation of teachers in school decision 
making is the Educational Policy Trust Agreement. In one 
interesting study, two researchers found that "in virtually ev-
ery case in which unions and management had explicitly and 
intentionally tried to solve educational problems they did so 
outside of the contract."47 Therefore, they designed a new form 
of agreement that would build upon, not replace, negotiated 
teacher contracts, and that would "allow labor and manage-
ment to negotiate and reach accord on organizational goals and 
policies."48 The procedures involved in reaching the agreement 
are relatively simple49 and the end product is a written com-
44. Finch & Nagel, supra note 35, at 1630. 
45. ld. 
46. ld. 
47. CHARLES TAYLOR KERCHNER & DOUGLAS E. MITCHELL, THE CHANGING 
IDEA OF A TEACHERS' UNION 24 7 (1988). 
48. ld. 
49. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 34, at 27. The 
National Educational Association describes the process this way: 
The way trust agreements work is fairly straightforward. They do not 
require that specific subjects be discussed. Instead, the local education 
employee organization and district select the area that will be addressed 
by the trust agreement. Each party establishes a trust agreement team to 
craft the agreement. The guidelines from the Trust Agreement Project 
request only that neither party bring an outsider (specifically a labor 
attorney) to the table and that management include at least one principal 
among its team members. 
ld. (citing JULIA E. KOPPICH & CHARLES T. KERCHNER, EDUCATIONAL POLICY TRUST 
AGREEMENTS: CONNECTING LABOR RELATIONS AND ScHOOL REFORM, A REPORT ON 
YEAR Two OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT PROJECT (1990)). 
·' 
., 
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pact between the school district and its teachers that gives 
teachers extensive authority over school policy matters. 50 
Trust agreements work to the benefit of individual teach-
ers and collective bargaining procedures in a number of ways. 
With respect to teachers, the primary advantage trust 
agreements present is that they provide teachers with an op-
portunity to participate directly in educational policy making 
without the negative effects of conventional employee involve-
ment (EI) programs.51 It is argued that teacher unions adher-
ing to industrial-union principles are now incompatible with 
public education, particularly because they focus bargaining on 
narrow rules of employment rather than on educational policies 
that have the most significant long-term impact on the 
workplace of teachers.52 Indeed, scholars recognize that while 
industrial-mode collective bargaining has accomplished much 
good for employees in all settings, "it has given workers only a 
very limited voice in the operation of the firm."53 Stating that 
it is time for a change, one author has noted: 
[l]t is clear that more and more American workers want 
something beyond just a package of rights and benefits in 
return for agreeing to do what they are told. Employees also 
want the chance to exercise their own judgment about the 
work they are doing; they want to face the challenge of mak-
ing a difference in the quality of their services and the suc-
cess of the enterprise. 54 
Trust agreements address this concept for teachers, en-
abling them to design and implement such central educational 
policies as "curriculum development, instructional goals, the 
assignment of students or teachers, the substance of evalua-
tion, and the bases for discipline and discharge of unprofession-
al teachers."55 Interestingly, whereas conventional EI initia-
tives56 automatically assume that management will imple-
50. !d. 
51. Regarding the negative characteristics of management-initiated employee 
involvement programs, see generally Conley et al., supra note 10, at 268-75; PAUL 
C. WEILER, GoVERNING THE WORKPLACE 205-211 (1990). 
52. Bacharach et al., supra note 19, at 102. 
53. WEILER, supra note 51, at 219. 
54. !d. 
55. KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 47, at 247. 
56. WEILER, supra note 5l,at 206 (noting that an employee involvement pro-
gram (EIP) "is almost invariably created by the employer. Management originates 
the idea, drafts the working document and the constitution, if there is one, ex-
( 
I 
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ment their terms, 57 a properly designed trust agreement 
would empower teachers themselves to carry out its provi-
sions.58 Thus, trust agreements would go a long way in resolv-
ing the tension "between the goal of enlarging workers' influ-
ence over what happens to them in their daily lives on the job 
and the delegation of the representation role to a large external 
union organization, in which the individual member or local 
unit has only limited influence."59 
With respect to collective bargaining, trust agreements are 
needed supplements,60 because they help to establish a solid 
relationship of trust between labor and management. While 
trust agreements may not be legally binding in the same fash-
ion as collective bargaining agreements,61 they have the ca-
pacity to influence formal negotiations that do result in legally 
enforceable documents.62 Certainly if an atmosphere of cre-
ative risk-sharing and problem-solving63 is developed through 
trust agreement processes, both teachers and management will 
be more willing to make binding commitments on educational 
policy issues in collective bargaining agreements. 
B. The Continued Importance of Strong Teacher Unions 
and Traditional Collective Bargaining 
Collaboration between teachers and management outside 
the formal bargaining process appears to play a critical role 
both in promoting more individual participation by teachers in 
school policy decisions and m encouraging better la-
plains the EIP's purpose, and modus operandi, and provides the facilities and re-
sources needed for its operation."). 
57. KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 47, at 250. 
58. !d. 
59. WEILER, supra note 51, at 221. 
60. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 34, at 27. 
61. The creators of the trust agreement concept propose that the agreement, 
if undermined by unworkable provisions or by the parties' bad faith, would be 
enforceable by an adjudicatory body. However, they suggest that such an adjudica-
tory body would not be a court, but rather a permanent umpire named in advance 
by the 
two parties. KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 47, at 251. 
62. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 274 (noting that successful reform initia-
tives arise from collective bargaining when the negotiators "are trusting colleagues, 
not suspicious strangers"). 
63. ld. (noting that local districts that have made progress with school reform 
have done so not by a process of conventional, bilateral bargaining, but through 
efforts "to create mutual gain, to promote problem solving, and to encourage com-
promise"). 
., 
.,I 
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bar/management relations.64 However, the essential role of 
collective bargaining itself in school reform efforts should not 
be overlooked by either side, for it is bargaining that validates 
and solidifies the changes being sought. 
There are certainly compelling arguments to be made for 
changing the conventional bargaining tactics used by educa-
tors.65 In fact, several scholars advocate a complete overhaul 
of teacher union methods that would move away from "indus-
trial" unionism in favor of more cooperative strategies. 66 Yet 
"tough" unionism and "hard" bargaining still have a legitimate 
place in education; it is arguable that without such an aggres-
sive approach by teacher unions, teacher protections will be 
eroded and meaningful participation will drown under the tidal 
wave of reform initiatives. It is necessary for unions to main-
tain at least some degree of spirited self-interest and firmness 
in order for teachers to be true agents for change in education-
al policy making. 
1. Confrontational bargaining is essential to reform. 
Many policymakers and educators are of the opinion that 
teacher unions are inherently adversarial and necessarily op-
posed to any efforts made to improve the performance and 
participation of teachers.67 Such opinion may influence, at 
least indirectly, the behavior of unions; if unions act in confor-
mity with expectations, they may adamantly oppose change 
and innovation with respect to school policy.68 Yet it would be 
64. See Finch & Nagel, supra note 35, at 1657 ("The potential of teacher bar-
gaining as a tool for reform, if any, depends on adoption of alternative bargaining 
strategies"). 
65. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 275 (discussing the popular concept of 
"principled negotiations" developed by Fisher & Ury, which encourages negotiators 
to "focus on interests, not positions"); WILLIAM G. WEBffi'ER, SR., EFFECTIVE COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 36-37 (1985) (noting that teacher unions 
should abandon the private sector model of bargaining and involve parents and 
citizens in collective bargaining). 
66. See WEILER, supra note 51, at 218-223 (advocating a move away from 
traditional industrial unionism toward "enterprise unionism; "it is undeniably char-
acteristic of [industrial-style] union representation that although the process may 
well be achieving many good things for workers, it is not doing so through the 
workers"); KERCHNER & MITCHELL, supra note 47, at 232 (proposing a shift from 
industrial unionism to "professional unionism," which would "give first priority to 
formulating appropriate teacher job definitions and supporting the development of a 
productive work culture"). 
67. Bacharach et. al., supra note 19, at 97-98. 
68. ld. at 98. 
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a myth to assume that current efforts to increase teacher par-
ticipation through a new regime of "collaborative" bargaining 
will result in labor-management relations that are particularly 
cooperative and nonconfrontational.69 At the same time, it 
would be inaccurate to claim that a surge of "new bargaining," 
based on informal, cooperative rendezvous between teachers 
and management, will automatically bring about substantial 
school reform. 70 
A better view is that collective bargaining does not gener-
ate conflict, but rather reveals it in a forum specially suited for 
securing its resolution.71 As one scholar has explained, "[o]ne 
of the most distinctive features of collective bargaining is that 
it combines elements of conflict and cooperation, providing 
incentives for the parties to cooperate by posing conflict as an 
alternative."72 Differences between teachers and management, 
both as to priorities and policies, should not be discouraged, but 
encouraged through the collective bargaining process.73 Not 
only does collective bargaining validate the existence of 
teachers' perspective and expertise, but by juxtaposing differ-
ences it provides an avenue whereby these differences may 
become the "source of interdependence and accommodation."74 
This interdependence, in turn, is highly consistent with notions 
of local control that are behind school-based management pro-
grams.75 
69. ld. 
70. ld. (explaining that to suggest that the move toward "participatory bar-
gaining" will result in especially cooperative and nonconfrontational relations in 
public education is misleading; "[t]o the extent that it may generate expectations of 
labor-management harmony that are impossible to satisfY, the suggestion may even 
discourage the gutsy experimentation and tolerance for disagreement that are nec-
essary for reconstruction to occur"). 
71. ld. 
72. ld. 
73. ld. at 104. 
74. ld. 
75. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
.. 
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2. Collective bargaining fosters democracy 
and professionalism. 
Besides fostering cooperation through conflict, 76 collective 
bargaining also plays a direct role in providing individual em-
ployees with an opportunity to be active participants in the 
management of an enterprise. Critics have argued that partici-
patory norms valued by employees are effectively quashed by 
the process of collective bargaining as it now exists. 77 In reali-
ty, however, unionized employees are often very involved in the 
decisions affecting their workplace. 78 As teachers learn to be 
participants within the bargaining process itself, there is hope 
that they will be accepted much more readily into the arena of 
school policy making, 79 long the sole prerogative of manage-
ment.80 
Moreover, collective bargaining is consistent with notions 
of teacher "professionalism." Certainly the push by teacher 
unions for things such as higher salaries and reduced work 
loads demonstrates a substantial degree of professional self-
interest.81 However, these professional goals of teachers are 
not antithetical to the goals of education reform. In fact, the 
goals of teachers and the goals of the educational system are 
often parallel, if not closely connected. 82 
76. See supra note 8 at 99 (noting that "[t]hose who are prepared to look be-
yond the messiness of the [collective bargaining] process ... can hardly dismiss 
the fundamentally 'cooperative' nature of an arrangement that encourages self-inter-
ested parties to search for ways of accommodating each other's concerns"). 
I d. 
77. WEILER, supra note 51, at 30. 
78. ld. Explaining this involvement, Weiler notes that 
there is a substantial degree of worker involvement in union elections, 
especially at the local level: the employees' views are taken into account 
in framing the bargaining agenda, the members vote on whether to strike 
or to ratify a settlement, and once the contract is in effect the local mem-
bership plays a major role in deciding whether particular cases are worth 
pursuing up the grievance arbitration ladder. Indeed, ... most unionized 
workers take a good deal more personal responsibility for their represen-
tation in and the results of their collective bargaining process than they 
do as citizens in the outside political process. 
79. Finch & Nagel, supra note 35, at 1667 (noting that "[i]n the final anal-
ysis, the contribution of collective bargaining to school personnel relations may 
come not from its generation of rules, but from its expansion of the non-contractual 
role of teachers is school policy making"). 
80. ld. at 1665-66. 
81. ld. at 1664. 
82. ld. 
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3. Collective bargaining legitimizes "employee involvement 
programs" and fosters a "team" approach. 
There are undoubtedly several advantages to "collabora-
tive" negotiations outside formal collective bargaining process-
es. In addition to those already mentioned,83 the National 
Education Association (NEA) has noted that potential benefits 
of collaborative bargaining include: (1) its support of the use of 
collective bargaining as a vehicle for education reform, (2) its 
potential to improve public confidence in the system, (3) its po-
tential to improve local associations' relationships with dis-
tricts, ( 4) its encouragement of creative solutions to difficult 
problems, and (5) its role in the development of long-term vi-
sion. 84 Yet "collaborative" methods also pose at least three sig-
nificant problems for teachers, all of which can be minimized 
by conventional collective bargaining. 
First, a primary danger of collaborative, participatory ap-
proaches is that they can lead to the failure of the union to 
appropriately deal with member interests.85 This failure re-
sults from the fact that teacher participation schemes, like the 
Educational Policy Trust Agreement, tend to stray beyond the 
bounds of policy making and enter into areas covered by the 
collective bargaining agreement.86 When conflicts arise be-
tween the trust agreement and the contract, both sides may 
negotiate a change in the contract or waive individual contract 
provisions,87 resulting in the loss of contractual teacher 
protections. If by doing so, unions compromise important terms 
and conditions of teachers' employment such as compensation 
and seniority, teachers may feel deserted. When teachers view 
the collective bargaining agreement as nothing but an empty 
shell, their faith in the system will be destroyed and they will 
be unwilling to participate in any form of school-based manage-
ment. 
Second, teacher participatory management schemes have 
the potential to fracture the bargaining unit and create serious 
hostility in the workplace.88 Practical reality dictates that 
when union facilitators in charge of school-based management 
83. See supra discussion Part III. 
84. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 34, at 33-34. 
85. Id. at 32. 
86. ld. at 30. 
87. Id. 
88. See EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 24. 
.. 
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programs continually have to lobby the administration for fi-
nancial support, and when most training is conducted by the 
administration, the union facilitators themselves will often 
begin to think and act like administrators. 89 This development 
causes division between union members integrally involved in 
site-based management and union members concerned with 
implementing the contract and handling grievances.90 
Collective bargaining, on the other hand, emphasizes team 
building and recognizes the unique roles belonging to each 
educator in the system.91 By properly and clearly separating 
the roles of teachers and managers, collective bargaining can 
structure site based management in a way that allows active 
teacher participation in policy making but that leaves true 
administrative duties with administrators.92 In short, collec-
tive bargaining fosters confidence and trust among all parties 
in a site-based management program. As a Transportation 
Communications Union official, speaking on Quality of Work 
Life programs, stated: 
Through the use of the collective bargaining tool, we feel 
we can set the stage for success in the use of Quality of Work 
Life programs. We want to help and to participate, but only if 
we can know and trust our partners. Again, this means com-
ing to an agreement through the bargaining process. Agree-
ments that clearly spell out the formation of such committees, 
their purpose, their duration, methods of evaluation, and if 
successful, how the rewards of that success will be shared by 
the parties involved.93 
Third and most importantly, because of their non-binding 
status, participatory management programs may not represent 
meaningful, permanent solutions to the lack of teacher deci-
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. See WEILER, supra note 51, at 150 (suggesting that the goal of "creating a 
cooperative, complementary team of employees helps explain, then, not simply the 
development of rules which limit supervisory arbitrariness to preserve morale, but 
also the content of such widespread standards as seniority in the allocation of 
positions, and pay systems that evaluate the job, not the person"). 
92. See Finch & Nagel, supra note 35, at 1668 ("Needed is some equilibrium 
between the rightful influence of professional educators and the imperative that the 
schools be managed. Collective bargaining may be an imperfect means of reaching 
that equilibrium, but it holds greater promise than the managerial traditions it re-
places"). 
93. EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 21. 
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sion-making involvement. Even though the creators of the 
Educational Policy Trust Agreement concept envision a type of 
binding compact,94 the fact is that trust agreements differ 
from collective bargaining in that they are morally, but not 
legally binding.95 Therefore, even if teachers are empowered 
through the agreement to help make school policies, implemen-
tation of their proposals may be frustrated if a revenue short-
fall or other unexpected problem arises.96 Collective bargain-
ing by an independent union is necessary to secure the contrac-
tual right to teacher participation97 and to secure the imple-
mentation of agreements reached by means of such participa-
tion.98 
4. Independent unions provide stability. 
Finally, with respect to radical reform efforts, teacher un-
ions may represent the only stability school districts have. 99 
With the public outcry for change in education, many people 
are proposing drastic overhauls that could not only seriously 
undermine important terms and conditions of teachers' employ-
ment, but that also represent ineffective "quick-fix" schemes. 
Commenting on this situation, one author has noted: 
Teachers ... have been accused of sacrificing the better-
ment of schools to their own narrow, selfish ends, such as 
better pay and benefits. Other evidence exists that unions are 
perhaps the only major hope for children, since the "produc-
ers" of education are among the few large, powerful, orga-
nized forces that fight regularly for more resources and better 
working conditions i.n education. Parents, the consumers of 
education, are becoming more active in "choice" schemes for 
selecting a school for their children but are limited by their 
94. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
95. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CRITICAL PROPOSAL, supra note 34, at 30. 
96. ld. 
97. WEILER, supra note 51, at 219-20. 
98. According to Weiler, 
the tacit assumption of the collective bargaining process is that the work-
ers, through the union, will deal with management and the shareholders 
on a somewhat more equal plane with respect to the employment rela-
tionship. Rather than workers simply making suggestions for 
management's approval, the union aspires to something closer to bilateral 
governance of the workplace, the product of which will be legal 
entitlements for the employees. 
ld. at 209. 
99. Bradley. supra note 23, at 17. 
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short-lived interest in education and their lack of organized 
power.100 
Consequently, teacher unions are capable not only of providing 
the impetus for reform, but also of providing the staying power 
necessary for effective reform measures to succeed. 
IV. SITE-BASED MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL PRACTICES: 
AN APPLICATION 
A practical way of examining how the principles discussed 
in this paper might work to the benefit of educators is to view 
them in the context of school district personnel practices. Argu-
ably at the crux of any effective reform effort, the hiring and 
assignment of teachers and principals is a hot issue. 101 This 
section explores the conflicts of interest that arise when person-
nel practices are altered and suggests a possible win/win pro-
cess for reconciling these conflicts. By utilizing both innovative 
collaborative processes as well as traditional collective bargain-
ing, teacher unions can drive changes in personnel practices 
that will lead the way in school reform. 
A. Developing an Educational Policy Trust Agreement 
The first step in the process of changing personnel practic-
es would be the development of a trust agreement addressing 
the concept of site-based management and teacher participation 
therein. This trust agreement would serve two purposes. First, 
it would be a mechanism whereby more individual teachers 
could be involved in the first stages of policy making. Even 
before they become active participants in local school-site deci-
sion making, teachers should have the opportunity, on a more 
significant basis than the current system of joint la-
bor/management committees, to discuss and decide important 
matters of policy. Second, it would lay the groundwork for a 
collective bargaining agreement appropriately protective of the 
100. LABOR RELATIONS IN EDUCATION 333 (Bruce S. Cooper ed., 1992). 
101. Bradley, supra note 23, at 16. "[I)n many big-city districts where 
devolution of authority may seem most critical, teachers are hired and assigned to 
jobs in a centralized way that allows individual schools little leeway in choosing 
and managing their own teachers. These procedures, many experts believe, eventu-
ally could undermine efforts across the nation to give schools more autonomy." ld. 
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group interests of teachers, particularly on the difficult issues 
that can arise with respect to personnel practices. 
1. The trust agreement would cover the issue of seniority. 
One of the most divisive issues regarding new schemes of 
teacher hiring is the role of seniority. Some "experts" apparent-
ly feel that the seniority system currently in place breeds in-
competence; a RAND Corporation report on decentralization 
stated: "If teachers continue to be assigned on the basis of se-
niority or other general criteria, staff assignment could become 
a serious barrier to the continuation of healthy site-managed 
schools."102 Many teachers themselves also want out from un-
der the regime of seniority; they want to do away with central-
ized hiring practices and hire their own colleagues based on 
philosophical and professional affinities. 103 Yet within the col-
laborative setting of trust agreement negotiations, all parties 
involved may come to realize that seniority is a necessary and 
appropriate element of any new system of hiring. 
First, seniority, or length of time in a school district, 
should be viewed as demonstrative of a teacher's serious com-
mitment to children and the system; it should be rewarded as a 
positive indicator of a teacher's love for his or her profession, 
not punished as a general indicator of teacher incompetence 
and inertia. The Supreme Court has recognized that seniority 
is important not only to the morale, but also the productivity of 
employees, 104 and trust agreement negotiations are a 
nonconfrontational method of discussing this principle. 
102. ld. 
103. ld. see also Lynn Olson, A Matter of Choice: Minn. Puts 'Charter' Schools' 
Idea to Test, EDUC. WEEK, Nov. 25, 1992, at 1 (noting that the Minnesota "charter 
schools" law, which "enables groups of licensed teachers to create independent 
pc;blic schools under a contract with a local school board," is more than just an 
innuvative educational project-it is also a "testing ground for what happens when 
teachers are given the legal authority to create their own schools, hire and fire 
their colleagues, and spend their money as they see fit"). 
104. Holding that an employer accused of Title VII discrimination was not re-
quired to grant retroactive seniority to a woman applicant for the period between 
the time it rejected her application and the time it later offered her employment, 
the Court in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 229 (1982), stated: "[T]he 
employer must . . . be prepared to cope with the deterioration in morale, labor 
unrest, and reduced productivity that may be engendered by inserting the claimant 
into the seniority ladder over the heads of the incumbents who have earned their 
places through their work on the job." 
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Second, the trust agreement could address the fact that 
seniority is important for fair and effective school reform. In 
addition to expressing concern over the possibility that once 
teachers are given broad discretion to hire colleagues, they will 
become "dictatorial,"105 teacher unions have reasoned that 
allowing teachers to narrow-mindedly structure their own cad-
res endangers the mission of public schools, i.e., to provide a 
marketplace of ideas.106 More importantly, it is possible that 
dispensing with a system of centralized transfer based on se-
niority would cause further stratification among schools al-
ready sharply divided in terms of racial composition and socio-
economic status. 107 In short, there is a fear that if teachers 
could freely work at any school they desire, the most senior and 
qualified teachers would be recruited away from poor urban 
schools most in need of their commitment and expertise. 
Third, the collaborative setting of trust agreement negotia-
tions would provide grounds for recognition that a seniority 
system is essential for good labor relations. Because seniority 
provisions are an essential component of most teacher collective 
bargaining agreements, 108 an upheaval of these provisions 
would certainly cause resentment among rank-and-file teach-
ers.109 In order for site based management initiatives to suc-
ceed, the school district must be prepared to court not only 
"lead" or "managerial" teachers, but also the vast majority of 
teachers whose primary focus is their individual classrooms. In 
light of the strong egalitarian norms of teachers, trust negotia-
tions could educate management that "seniority plays a central 
role in allocating burdens and benefits among employees"110 
and that without a centralized system based on this right of 
"overriding importance,"111 labor conflict may substantially 
increase. Among other things, conflict may brew if the tenure 
system is placed in jeopardy112 and if transfers become arbi-
105. Bradley, supra note 23, at 16. 
106. Id. (quoting Jack Steinberg, director of education issues, Philadelphia Fed-
eration of Teachers, who has stated: "The thought of only having people in your 
school who agree with our philosophy is one that we reject, because the whole 
purpose of restructuring is to give an opportunity to all ideas to come out and be 
discussed"). 
107. Id. 
108. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra note 104. 
110. Ford Motor, 458 U.S. at 239-40. 
111. Id. (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76 (1982) 
(quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964))). 
112. See Olson, supra note 103, at 10 (noting that one proposed "charter 
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trary decisions based on financial concerns. 113 Considering 
that the goal of school reform is to encourage more cooperation 
and participation by all parties, this conflict may not be worth 
the price. 
2. The trust agreement could address issues of managerial 
responsibility. 
Another important issue that a trust agreement could 
address is the problem of how to allocate "managerial" tasks. 
As previously discussed, while teachers do want to have more 
authority and participation in policy making, many of them do 
not want to take on the responsibility of actually managing the 
schools. Consequently, the collaborative setting of the trust 
negotiations may be an excellent forum for reaching agreement 
on what the appropriate boundaries of teacher management 
should be. 
For example, teachers participating in the trust agreement 
sessions might want to emphasize that while they do not want 
to run the schools, they are willing to support competent princi-
pals capable of running schools well. 114 A possible result of 
the trust agreement, then, would be a system wherein teachers 
have broad authority to hire principals directly115 and dele-
gate what managerial authority they wish to the principal. 
Teachers in such an agreement would have the authority to 
participate actively in school policy making while at the same 
time retaining appropriate amounts of classroom time; most of 
the strictly administrative duties could be delegated to the principal 116 
school" "would have enabled nontenured teachers at the school to retain their jobs 
when tenured teachers elsewhere in the district were being laid off because of 
budget cuts"). 
113. See Bradley, supra note 23, at 17 (noting that schools given an individual 
budget and broad discretion over how it will be spent may be tempted to transfer 
senior teachers in order to free up salary money for other uses). 
114. Finch & Nagel, supra note 35, at 1668 (quoting Susan Moore Johnson, 
Teacher Unions in Schools: Authority and Accommodation, 53 HARV. EDUC. REV. 
309, 326 (1983)). 
115. For example, in Chicago, "principals now work directly for schools on 
four-year performance contracts . . . teachers continue to work for the school sys-
tem under a central contract." Bradley, supra note 23, at 16. 
116. Ann Bradley, All About Adam, TEACHER MAGAZINE, Apr. 1992, at 16, 21 
(noting that Adam Urbanski, president of the Rochester, N.Y. teachers' association, 
advocates "instructional design teams" run by teachers with the "administrivia" of 
school life left to the principal). 
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3. The trust agreement could address incentives. 
Finally, the cooperative nature of trust agreement negotia-
tions could prove fertile ground for a meaningful discussion on 
the issue of teacher incentives. In addition to recognizing that 
most teachers are unwilling to accept additional responsibilities 
without a concurrent rise in compensation, 117 trust negotia-
tions could also focus on the fact that merit-pay systems are 
largely opposed by teachers as violative of their egalitarian 
norms. 118 Therefore, a trust agreement might elicit a respon-
sible exchange between labor and management regarding the 
importance of a pay system that evaluates the job, not the per-
son.119 Were the parties to reach agreement that any increase 
in individual teachers' compensation should be tied to volun-
tary assumption of additional responsibilities rather than as a 
reward for "good"120 teaching, it is more likely that school-
based management initiatives would be successful. 
B. Enforcing the Trust Agreement 
Through Collective Bargaining 
Once a relationship of trust is developed and teachers have 
had an opportunity to be participatory citizens in the policy 
decisions of their school, the next step is for the union and 
management to sit down in formal negotiations and bargain 
over how the trust agreement's provisions will become part of 
the binding contract. This is an essential step; if both sides do 
not exercise good faith and show willingness to bargain over 
the terms discussed in the collaborative trust agreement, teach-
ers will view the trust agreement as just another manipulative 
tool of the administration. 121 Moreover, without collective bar-
gaining, the protections teachers enjoy and need could be dilut-
ed. 
First and foremost, collective bargaining is needed to en-
sure the continued viability of seniority. Because transfer poli-
cies are usually tied to seniority/22 the interests of teachers 
117. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
119. WEILER, supra note 51, at 150. 
120. Evaluation in teaching, perhaps more than most occupations, involves a 
subjective process "where the actual contribution of any individual to the group 
product is very difficult to measure, at least in a way that will be evident to fel· 
low workers." WEILER, supra note 51, at 150. 
121. See Conley, supra note 10, at 261. 
122. See David S. Doty, The Impact of Federal Labor Policy on the Americans 
I 
l 
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will be best represented when changes in personnel practices 
recognize the validity of seniority. Teachers deserve to have 
their seniority rights protected through collective bargain-
ing123 and embodied in a contract. 
Second, collective bargaining is needed to ensure that site 
based management initiatives contain clauses providing ade-
quate leeway for teachers beginning to experiment with new 
roles. Where such clauses are not in place, reform initiatives 
may have a fate similar to the Benjamin Jepson Magnet Ele-
mentary School in New Haven, Connecticut. Opened in the fall 
of 1991, this school was run by a teacher "facilitator,"124 rath-
er than a principal, and was focused on a nongraded program 
that stressed parental involvement. 125 Only a little over a 
year passed, however, before the board of education appointed 
a principal to manage the school, basing its decision on 31 stu-
dent transfers and complaints by parents that the school was 
poorly run. 126 
Collective bargaining agreements may protect against this 
scenario by including contractual language that gives teacher 
"management" teams and other teacher participatory initiatives 
adequate time to "work out the kinks"; teachers should be insu-
lated from arbitrary administrative decisions that will under-
mine their efforts to reform schools. In addition, bargaining is 
important so that the appropriate roles of "teacher-managers" 
are clearly and legally defined. Speaking about his experience 
with Disabilities Act of 1990: Collective Bargaining Agreements in a New Era of 
Civil Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055, 1082, 1086 (1992). 
123. See Schick v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1969) (stating that se-
niority is "valid subject matter for the collective bargaining process"); Oneita Knit-
ting Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1967) (stating that because 
seniority has a vital impact on "terms and conditions of employment" it is a man-
datory subject of bargaining); NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 979-80 
(8th Cir. 1967) ("Seniority rights and layoff practices have been recognized by the 
courts as falling within the broad defmition of 'terms and conditions of employment' 
(citation omitted)). 
124. One might ask why a principal could not also be a "facilitator." See supra 
note 114 and accompanying text; see also Rosow & ZAGER, supra note 8, at 71 
("Teachers and other educators . . . long to see a new breed of principals. They 
reco=end that all new principals have the self-confidence to share power, the pa-
tience to work with teachers until consensus is reached, and the courage to let 
teachers make occasional mistakes as they experiment with reforms"). 
125. Union Head Discusses Problems with Teacher-Run School, EDUC. WEEK, 
Jan. 27, 1993, at 6. 
126. !d. 
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with the Benjamin Jepson school, Fran Carrano, the president 
of the New Haven Federation of Teachers, explained: 
We had some problems just sort of working out all of the 
details of how the facilitator should function, the teachers' 
role, and the parents' role. Together with working on the 
curriculum for an ungraded school, it just got to be a lot to do. 
Like everything else, one of the things we didn't realize 
is that it takes a period of time just to get acclimated to both 
the way a school such as this operates and the decision mak-
ing part of it. What are the appropriate roles for everyone to 
have?127 
Finally, collective bargaining is necessary to preclude trust 
agreements and other collaborative agreements from supersed-
ing egalitarian teacher wage scales with incentives based solely 
on subjective evaluations of performance. School districts inter-
ested in successful site-based management would do well to 
heed the observation of one scholar who notes that "[ w ]hile ... 
administrative restraints on the operation of market incentives 
might seem to sacrifice certain immediate spurs for individual 
productivity, their broader value consists in the reinforcement 
they give to the cooperative attitudes needed for a productive 
work team."128 
C. The Role of Binding Arbitration 
The final step in this process of reform might utilize bind-
ing arbitration. Mter a trust agreement is developed and collec-
tive bargaining begins in an attempt to make the essential 
components of the trust agreement binding, it is likely that 
bargaining will occasionally come to an impasse. At that point, 
the teacher union and management would each put forth their 
best offer and let a disinterested party decide the matter. For 
example, if teachers and management cannot come to agree-
ment on appropriate pay for certain managerial responsibili-
ties, both sides could submit their best proposal and let the 
arbitrator rule as to which one is preferable. As discussed 
above, 129 the idea behind binding arbitration is that it won't 
be used; the threat of its invocation would hopefully be enough 
127. ld. 
128. WEILER, supra note 51, at 150. 
129. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
. 
l 
117] TEACHER UNIONS & EDUCATION REFORM 141 
in most instances to encourage good faith negotiation and coop-
eration between the parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There appears to be broad consensus that if substantial 
school reform is ever to take place, teachers must be active 
participants in the process. The potential for innovation and 
improvement is great as school boards and administrators come 
to redefine involvement in educational policy-making as some-
thing they need from teachers, 130 rather than something they 
only allow teachers. 131 At the same time, however, teachers 
are unlikely to be enthusiastic about reform unless both 
teacher unions and management understand that the desire of 
many teachers to be individually involved in school decision 
making is at odds with many of the interests and rights of 
teachers as a collective group. Therefore, an appropriate bal-
ance needs to be struck between encouraging collaborative 
participation and collective protection. 
This paper suggests that such a balance could be arranged 
by utilizing a combination of collaborative and conventional 
systems of bargaining. Perhaps the bottom line is that while 
increased teacher involvement in site-based decision making 
may be beneficial to both teachers personally and schools in 
general, teacher unions play an important role in providing 
guidance for reform, primarily by means of collective bargain-
ing. Even though collaborative methods of bargaining are criti-
cal to a new system of public schools emphasizing decentraliza-
tion over the traditional industrial model, 132 conventional col-
lective bargaining is still very important for purposes of stabili-
ty and fairness. One prominent educator has noted: 
The collective voice of teachers speaks through their union. 
Policy makers who ignore the voices of teachers and of their 
local unions do so at some risk. For they discourage loyalty to 
public schooling, and they could promote the abandonment of 
the profession by those who might prove best able to reform 
it.133 
130. Bacharach et. al., supra note 19, at 103. 
131. Id. 
132. Bradley, supra note 23, at 1. 
133. Susan M. Johnson & Niall C.W. Nelson, Teaching Reform in an Active 
Voice, Pin DELTA KAPPAN, Apr. 1987, at 591, 597-98. 
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As they jointly explore new frontiers of school reform, both 
unions and management will be successful as long as they 
follow a course that does not threaten the fundamental terms 
and conditions of teachers' employment. The future of public 
education depends on the satisfaction, strength and vision of 
organized teachers. 
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